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INTRODUCTION 
A decade ago, at the end of her characteristically astute provocation of law and 
literature scholars in “Law, Literature, and the Vanishing Real,” Julie Peters 
suggested moving beyond the law/literature dichotomy into both “law, culture, and 
the humanities” and global “disciplinary tourism.”1 By silently glossing over 
“literature” in favor of the broader terms “culture” or the “humanities,” new 
formulations of the area of study might, she indicated, help to dispel the 
“interdisciplinary illusion” fueling the opposition between and relation of law and 
literature, dispensing with the notion shared by scholars of both law and literature 
that the “real” is located just over the methodological divide between the fields.2 
Peters’ essay valuably rejected the binary that appears in far too many versions of 
law and literature scholarship. Its aspiration to put aside disciplinary boundaries 
among sectors of the humanities in studying “law, culture, and the humanities” or 
 
* Bernadette Meyler is Professor of Law and Deane F. Johnson Faculty Scholar at Stanford Law School. 
This Article was originally drafted and delivered as the 2013 Cornell University Society for the 
Humanities Annual Invitational Lecture and presented for discussion at a workshop on “Teaching Law 
and Humanities” at Princeton University as well as at the 2014 “Law As . . .” III symposium at the 
University of California, Irvine School of Law. I am very grateful to the participants in these events for 
their questions and comments, and owe special debts to Peter Brooks, Will Evans, Amalia Kessler, Tim 
Murray, Matthew Smith, Brook Thomas, and Meredith Wallis. 
1. Julie Stone Peters, Law, Literature, and the Vanishing Real: On the Future of an Interdisciplinary 
Illusion, in TEACHING LAW AND LITERATURE 71, 83–84 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2011). The essay was 
first published in “the changing profession” section of PMLA. Julie Stone Peters, Law, Literature, and 
the Vanishing Real: On the Future of an Interdisciplinary Illusion, 120 PMLA 442, 451 (2005). 
2. Peters, supra note 1, at 71–73. 
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“law and the humanities” tout court has not, however, proved entirely feasible, nor is 
it necessarily desirable. 
As those familiar with “law and society” know, the turn toward a broader 
category—like culture, or the humanities, or society—may not remain unvexed, as 
questions arise respecting the unity of the umbrella term and its framing in 
opposition to law.3 Moreover, from within the parameters of law, and particularly 
those of legal pedagogy, “law and the humanities” designates not precisely a 
decomposition of the boundaries between law and its outside, but a gesture toward 
one form of law’s outside, the humanistic, as opposed generally to the social 
sciences.4 Despite the proliferation of the “law and” fields, many—including law 
and the humanities—still appear from the vantage point of legal pedagogy as a 
superficial carapace that can be shed when financial exigencies press law schools to 
cut costs and reduce tuition. 
This Article aims to demonstrate the centrality of the humanities to the core 
of law school pedagogy today.5 At the same time, by focusing on two areas within 
the humanities—literature and history—it tries to show how disciplines still matter, 
both as engines and impediments. Examining the shifting passions that bind law, 
literature, and history to each other, it foregrounds the dynamic quality of 
disciplinary relations as the attraction of fields for each other waxes and wanes. This 
dynamism itself advances the possibilities for new births of knowledge. Although 
unstable and of unknown fate, the love triangle of law, literature, and history 
continues to spawn fertile offspring. 
The notion of the love triangle has captured the imagination of many writers, 
including Simone de Beauvoir, whose own experiences furnished material for her 
 
3. For a brief account of the history of the law and society movement and how it became an 
umbrella category for a variety of disparate kinds of scholarship, see Austin Sarat, Vitality Amidst 
Fragmentation: On the Emergence of Postrealist Law and Society Scholarship, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION 
TO LAW AND SOCIETY 1 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004). Almost twenty years earlier, Lawrence Friedman 
described the impetus behind the movement and the approaches it comprehended in The Law and Society 
Movement. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763, 764 (1986). Work 
emerging from earlier “Law As . . .” symposia at the University of California, Irvine School of Law, has 
foregrounded the problems with the “law and” formulation. As Chris Tomlins and John Comaroff 
explained, the movement from “law and . . .” to “law as . . .” “suggests that explanations of law are not 
to be found, either necessarily or sufficiently, in its relation to other things.” Christopher Tomlins & 
John Comaroff, “Law As . . .”: Theory and Practice in Legal History, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1039, 1041 
(2011). Furthermore, “‘law as . . .’ dwells . . . on the conditions of possibility for a critical knowledge of 
the here-and-now . . . .” Id. at 1044. 
4. There are, of course, a number of disciplines—such as History and Anthropology—that 
could be considered either part of the humanities or of the social sciences, taking on different valences 
when identified with one or the other general rubric. 
5. The Article in this respect agrees with Sherman Clark’s claim that it is not “a question of 
‘balancing’ the professional and personal elements, as perhaps by mixing in some ‘law and ___’ or 
theoretical classes, along with practical and doctrinal classes. Indeed, . . . the dichotomy between 
practical training and the development of deeper capacities is a false one.” Sherman Clark, Law School 
As Liberal Education, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235, 236 (2013). 
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first novel, She Came to Stay (L’Invitee).6 The heroine of the 1943 work, Françoise, 
resembles de Beauvoir in a number of respects, including in her relationship with 
Pierre Labrousse, a thinly veiled version of Jean-Paul Sartre. Intimately involved 
with each other since their early twenties, Sartre and de Beauvoir had agreed to 
renounce jealousy and act freely on their desires for others. One of the objects of 
these desires was Olga Kosakiewicz, a young woman of Russian parentage whom 
they supported so that she could live alongside them in Rouen and then Paris. 
Unsuccessful in seducing Olga, Sartre moved on to her younger sister, Wanda, with 
whom he proceeded to have an affair of several years. The character of Xavière in 
She Came to Stay (a work dedicated to Olga) collects attributes of both sisters. Despite 
the mutual involvement of the various protagonists, Sartre and de Beauvoir—as 
well as their characters—found that “the most satisfying form of communication 
was tête-à-tête. If Sartre was eating with Wanda at the Coupole, or if Beauvoir was 
seeing Olga at the Dôme, there was no question of the other’s spontaneously joining 
them.”7 
De Beauvoir’s reduction of Olga and Wanda to one character in the novel 
suggests the extent to which the idea of the love triangle—as opposed to a larger 
and messier mélange—proves imaginatively productive. Although isolating law, 
literature, and history may similarly elide characters affiliated with them, the 
stylization brings to the fore more clearly both the generative and competitive 
aspects of the relations among the three. On a broader level, the figure of the love 
triangle insists that interdisciplinarity need not be conceived as either an exclusive 
connection between two or as an entirely open multiplicity; instead, intermediate 
arrangements may spur new developments. 
Part I of this Article traces the genealogy of the relationships among law, 
literature, and history so far. First breaking down each component pair, it concludes 
with two tensions that have characterized the interactions between legal history and 
law and literature, those of authority and normativity. Part II then focuses on a 
pedagogical experiment I designed to put into practice the idea that interdisciplinary 
work might be prompted by delving further into the intricacies of one particular 
discipline, that of law. In Part III, the Article returns to considering two possible 
ways to reinvigorate the relationship among law, literature, and history in the 
classroom and on the page. Throughout, discussions of scholarship are interwoven 
with those of pedagogy. In this way, the Article aims not only to address the small 
cadre of scholars working on law, literature, and history, but also to resound more 
broadly in the classroom, whether in the experience of law students, liberal arts 
undergraduates, or graduate students in the humanities. 
 
6. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, SHE CAME TO STAY 210–11 (Y. Moyse & R. Senhouser trans., The 
World Publishing Co. 1954) (1943). 
7. HAZEL ROWLEY, TÊTE-À-TÊTE: SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR & JEAN-PAUL SARTRE 73 (2005). 
For a comprehensive discussion of the biographical story and its relation to the fictional ones furnished 
in She Came to Stay and other works penned by those in the Sartre-de Beauvoir circle, see id. at 1–146. 
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I. BREAKING DOWN THE AFFAIRS 
For a while Françoise gazed with a lover’s eyes at this woman whom Pierre 
loved. 
  “On the contrary, everything could be so easy,” she said. “A closely 
united couple is something beautiful enough, but how much more 
wonderful are three persons who love each other with all their being.” She 
waited a while. Now the moment had come for her, too, to commit herself 
and to take her risks. “Because, after all, it is certainly a kind of love that 
exists between you and me.” 
. . . 
  “You see, if there is also love between you and Labrousse, what a 
beautiful well-balanced trio that makes,” she said. “It’s not a recognized 
way of living, but I don’t think it will be too difficult for us. Don’t you 
think so, too?”8 
For any love triangle, a story can be told about how each pair within it came 
to know each other, whether through hushed whispers overheard from afar, a 
dramatic confrontation, or a chance encounter and exchange of glances. Often one 
of the three is a latecomer to the relationship between two, intervening to destabilize 
an established dynamic; how enduring the effects of the intervention will be can 
remain uncertain for quite some time. Law, literature, and history are no exception. 
As J.G.A. Pocock famously demonstrated in The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal 
Law, the origins of modern historiography are themselves almost coextensive with 
the beginnings of modern Anglo-American law in seventeenth-century England.9 
Despite this venerable heritage, legal history was not taught regularly in separate law 
school courses until after World War I, when it became part of the curricula of some 
elite schools; in the 1960s, law schools finally embraced legal history more broadly.10 
Law and literature as an area of study boasts an even more recent history, often 
dated back to the 1970s with James Boyd White’s The Legal Imagination, which 
countered the emerging field of law and economics with a focus on the humanistic 
backdrop of law.11 Of course, isolated works like Sir Dunbar Plunket Barton’s 1929 
Links Between Shakespeare and the Law, tracing legal themes and allusions, or Benjamin 
Cardozo’s essay Law and Literature, examining the rhetoric of judicial opinions, 
 
8. DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 6, at 210–11. 
9. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF 
ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 31 (1987). 
10. See Joan Sidney Howland, A History of Legal History Courses Offered in American Law Schools, 53 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 363, 375 (2013). 
11. JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION, at xix (1973). As Gary Minda writes, 
discussing both White’s Legal Imagination and Richard Weisberg’s Failure of the Word, 
The jurisprudential zeitgeist for two of the most important intellectual movements in law—
law and literature and law and economics—can . . . be found arising in the intellectual 
ferment at the University of Chicago in the 1970s and 1980s. It was a time when the winds 
of change were blowing across the intellectual landscape at the University of Chicago and 
when new ideas about how to best approach the study of law came into existence. 
Gary Minda, Reflections, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2397, 2398 (2005) (citation omitted). 
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existed before that.12 None of these interventions attempted to engage literary 
studies as a disciplinary matter, unlike the scholarship that has proliferated since the 
1970s. During this more recent period, the field of literary studies has attempted to 
seduce law away from history, or, perhaps more accurately, to seduce law and 
history together. In the process, it has frequently suffered rebuffs at the hands of 
one or the other. It remains to be seen whether the love triangle will become a true 
ménage a trois. 
The early story of what has come to be known as the law and literature 
enterprise has been told, and told well. In brief, as both Jane Baron and Julie Peters 
have elaborated, humanist, rhetorical, and narrative strands predominated at least 
through the movement’s twenty-fifth birthday.13 If the “humanist” vision of law 
and literature emphasized “its commitment to the human as an ethical corrective to 
the scientific and technocratic visions of law that had prevailed in most of the 
twentieth century,” the “hermeneutic” instead deployed interpretive techniques 
derived from literary theory in legal contexts.14 Beginning in the late 1980s, 
feminism and critical race studies focused attention instead on the personal 
narratives of those not previously considered the proper subjects of law and the 
transformative potential of those narratives.15 
This is where, however, many accounts of law and literature stop, either 
positing the death of the enterprise, insisting upon its survival, or presenting new 
possible paths.16 Within the past several decades, two developments have occurred, 
both of which opened new avenues for law and literature. Following the 1998 
translation of Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer into English and the rise of interest in 
sovereignty and biopolitics within literature departments, political theory attracted 
adherents and generated concern with the connection between law and politics.17 
Even Agamben’s own State of Exception, the sequel to Homo Sacer, addresses the 
provisions—or lack thereof—for states of emergency within various constitutional 
 
12. DUNBAR PLUNKET BARTON, LINKS BETWEEN SHAKESPEARE AND THE LAW 3–4 (1929); 
BENJAMIN CARDOZO, Law and Literature, in LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND 
ADDRESSES 3 (1931). 
13. See Jane B. Baron, Law, Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108 YALE L.J. 1059, 
1063–66 (1999); Peters, supra note 1, at 72–76. 
14. Peters, supra note 1, at 73–75. 
15. Id. at 76. 
16. Peter Goodrich addresses claims of the death of law and literature in “Screening Law.” See 
generally Peter Goodrich, Screening Law, 21 LAW & LITERATURE 1 (2009). In that piece, Goodrich 
embraces new or renewed directions, lamenting the narrowness of “literature” and positing that 
“literature . . . was never an adequate or full description of the political spectacle of legality,” which 
instead “depends upon mixed media.” Id. at 3. In his aptly named essay, “Law and Literature As 
Survivor,” Richard Weisberg alludes to the possibility of “a cyclical return to the unity of law and 
literature.” Richard H. Weisberg, Law and Literature As Survivor, in TEACHING LAW AND LITERATURE, 
supra note 1, at 40. 
17. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (Daniel Heller-
Roazen trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1998) (1995). 
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regimes.18 Interest in sovereignty has prompted examination of legal and political 
theory by those working on contemporary globalization as well as on early modern 
monarchies.19 The implementation of human rights and the concomitant rise of a 
notion of a responsibility to protect within international law have likewise furnished 
subjects for both literary and legal scholarship.20 
Even before this turn to political theory, the arrival of New Historicism in 
literary studies brought with it a host of materials that might previously have been 
considered less relevant to scholarly endeavors. Early versions of New Historicism 
often focused on a particular period and tied analyses of literary with nonliterary 
works from the same period; the texts considered alongside classics of the literary 
canon included accounts of Early Modern colonial encounters and reports by 
Victorian reformers.21 
Despite emerging in opposition to formalism,22 the New Historicists’ 
approach was text based—too text based for some, who argued that the method 
“amounts to a large claim about society or social relations based on some very close 
readings of tropes and figures in a number of parallel texts, say a novel, a medical 
treatise, a classic of political economy, and maybe some popular journalism” or that 
it simply exported techniques of reading from literary to other objects, which “can 
mean that the social text turns out to be read as [scholars] have been trained to read 
a literary text, that is, in traditional formalist terms.”23 Many of the most prominent 
 
18. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2005) 
(2003). 
19. The essay collection THE SCAFFOLD OF SOVEREIGNTY: A GLOBAL INTERDISCIPLINARY 
APPROACH (Stefanos Geroulanos et al. eds., forthcoming 2015), includes precisely such a range of 
work. Philip Lorenz’s recent book, THE TEARS OF SOVEREIGNTY: PERSPECTIVES OF POWER IN 
RENAISSANCE DRAMA (2013), relies on Agamben but focuses primarily on the Early Modern period. 
20. For some representative books in the area of human rights, see ELIZABETH S. ANKER, 
FICTIONS OF DIGNITY: EMBODYING HUMAN RIGHTS IN WORLD LITERATURE (2012); ANNE 
ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2011); and  
JOSEPH R. SLAUGHTER, HUMAN RIGHTS, INC.: THE WORLD NOVEL, NARRATIVE FORM, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007). 
21. For example, Thomas Harriot’s A Brief and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia 
(1588) plays a central role in Stephen Greenblatt’s classic essay Invisible Bullets, see Stephen Greenblatt, 
Invisible Bullets: Renaissance Authority and Its Subversion, Henry IV and Henry V, in POLITICAL 
SHAKESPEARE: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL MATERIALISM 18 ( Jonathan Dollimore & Alan Sinfield eds., 2d 
ed. 1994), while Mary Poovey analyzes Edwin Chadwick’s 1842 Report on the Sanitary Condition of the 
Labouring Population of Great Britain at length, see MARY POOVEY, MAKING A SOCIAL BODY: BRITISH 
CULTURAL FORMATION, 1830–1864, at 115–31 (1995). 
22. See STEPHEN J. GREENBLATT, LEARNING TO CURSE: ESSAYS IN EARLY MODERN 
CULTURE 1–4 (1990). 
23. Regenia Gagnier, Methodology and New Historicism, 4 J. VICTORIAN CULTURE 116, 119 (1999); 
Carolyn Porter, History and Literature: “After the New Historicism,” 21 NEW LITERARY HIST. 253, 257 
(1990). Peter Hohendahl wrote relatedly that “the New History is at home in American literature 
departments rather than in history departments for fairly obvious reasons: the problem that the New 
Historians address is that of inter- and contextualization of literary texts—a question that is only of 
marginal interest to professional historians, especially social historians.” Peter Uwe Hohendahl, A 
Return to History? The New Historicism and Its Agenda, 55 NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE, Winter 1992, at 87, 
89–90. 
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works of the movement therefore put aside the question of whether a text had 
emerged out of some systematic framework—such as the legal—that shaped its 
mode of expression and even its meaning.24 
In the effort to distinguish itself from an older historicism and to avoid 
teleology, New Historicism also embraced the anecdotal. As Stephen Greenblatt 
wrote in his introduction to one of the classic works of the movement, Learning to 
Curse: Essays in Early Modern Culture, “What is crucial for me . . . is the insistence on 
contingency, the sense if not of a break then at least of a swerve in the ordinary and 
well-understood succession of events. The historical anecdote functions less as 
explanatory illustration than as disturbance, that which requires explanation, 
contextualization, interpretation.”25 Instead of focusing on the question of how a 
phrase moved from one sphere to another, New Historicists concentrated on the 
narrative that a present observer might construct based on its occurrence in various 
domains. As Peter Hohendahl glossed it, “the agenda of the New Historians [is] a 
hermeneutic project, in which the critic is seen as locally situated, without absolute 
access to the truth, but at the same time motivated by his or her social and political 
concerns.”26 
Recent work in law and literature influenced by New Historicism has diverged 
from its forebears in several ways. It is characterized by a return to considerations 
of form—not only form as traditionally conceived within literary study, but legal 
form as well. These legal forms comprehend both the kind of legal work most 
accessible to literary scholars—the judicial opinion—and modes of procedure that 
call upon the more arcane knowledge of the legal scholar. The very title of Bradin 
Cormack’s A Power to Do Justice: Jurisdiction, English Literature, and the Rise of Common 
Law indicates its interest in connecting the particularity of the legal mode of 
asserting authority—jurisdiction—with the literary.27 While Max Brzezinksi and 
others have critiqued the new literary formalism for focusing on form instead of 
content,28 scholars operating within the encounter among law, literature, and history 
 
24. Brook Thomas’s work has always furnished an exception to this general tendency. Even in 
his earliest book on law and literature, Cross-Examinations of Law and Literature, Thomas considered law 
as an institution producing effects across culture rather than as a set of texts among others. See generally 
BROOK THOMAS, CROSS-EXAMINATIONS OF LAW AND LITERATURE: COOPER, HAWTHORNE, 
STOWE, AND MELVILLE (1987). 
25. GREENBLATT, supra note 22, at 5. 
26. Hohendahl, supra note 23, at 99. 
27. BRADIN CORMACK, A POWER TO DO JUSTICE: JURISDICTION, ENGLISH LITERATURE, 
AND THE RISE OF THE COMMON LAW, 1509–1625 (2007). 
28. Categorizing versions of the “new formalism,” Marjorie Levinson has divided them into 
“activist formalism,” which “want[s] to restore to today’s reductive reinscription of historical reading 
its original focus on form” and “normative formalism,” identified with “those who campaign to bring 
back a sharp demarcation between history and art, discourse and literature, with form . . . the prerogative 
of art.” Marjorie Levinson, What Is New Formalism?, 122 PMLA 558, 559 (2007). As understood in 
Levinson’s essay, “New formalist work concentrates in the areas of early modern and Romantic period 
study.” Id. at 562. Turning to critics of modernism, Max Brezinski has identified and lamented a third 
variety of formalism, that which “presents what Levinson calls ‘normative formalism’ as itself the only 
means for ‘activist criticism’ and attempts to square the circle, to present the return to modernist norms 
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have tended to demonstrate the constitutive nature of the formal aspects of both 
law and literature, showing how literary and legal authority both find themselves 
established through metaphor, precedent, and jurisdiction. This turn has, in effect, 
reconciled the dichotomy Robert Weisberg identified in speaking of the division of 
law and literature into “law as literature” and “law and literature.”29 If one takes 
seriously the formal aspects of the materials involved, the same project can both 
read law as literature and see law in literary form. 
Scholarship in this mode also tends to focus on a particular theme that crosses 
over the legal-literary divide and to explore the development of the topic in question 
through the mutual operations of literature and law. In doing so, it raises questions 
about the mechanisms by which concepts circulate among sectors of society within 
a particular period. Luke Wilson’s Theaters of Intention: Drama and the Law in Early 
Modern England or Oliver Arnold’s The Third Citizen: Shakespeare’s Theater and the Early 
Modern House of Commons both resonate with this approach.30 Finally, the tone of 
these works tends to bear a greater resemblance to that of historians’ writings, 
generally framed without immediate reference to the situation of the critic herself. 
While this type of law and literature scholarship—increasingly connected with 
close historical analysis or delving into law’s relation with political theory—has 
created a significant mark in the academy, most of its practitioners have resided 
institutionally outside law schools.31 Hence many law and literature courses taught 
to law students fall within older paradigms, like that embraced by Richard Posner’s 
popular textbook, Law and Literature, now in its third edition.32 
 
as itself a form of political activism.” Max Brezinski, The New Modernist Studies: What’s Left of Political 
Formalism?, 76 MINN. REV. 109, 117 (2011). Taking as his prime example Martin Puchner’s Poetry of the 
Revolution: Marx, Manifestos, and the Avant-Garde, Brezinski claims that Puchner’s book evacuates Marxism 
of its political urgency by focusing on the effects of the manifesto form. Id. at 114–15. Putting to one 
side the accuracy of this account of Puchner’s work, it could not be extended to recent “new formalist” 
scholarship in law and literature, which presents a variety of complicated dialectical relations between 
form and content along the lines that Brezinski appears to be advocating. Id. at 115. 
29. See Robert Weisberg, Law, Literature, and Cultural Unity: Between Celebration and Lament, in 
TEACHING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 1, at 86, 88. 
30. See generally OLIVER ARNOLD, THE THIRD CITIZEN: SHAKESPEARE’S THEATER AND THE 
EARLY MODERN HOUSE OF COMMONS (2007) (examining the political theories implicit in several of 
Shakespeare’s plays in relation to conceptions of parliamentary representation in seventeenth-century 
England); LUKE WILSON, THEATERS OF INTENTION: DRAMA AND THE LAW IN EARLY MODERN 
ENGLAND (2000) (tracing the early modern English transmission of the language of premeditation 
within legal and dramatic texts). 
31. The editors of the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Early Modern Law and Literature, Bradin 
Cormack and Lorna Hutson, have constructed the volume in line with these recent developments in 
law and literature scholarship. OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EARLY MODERN LAW AND LITERATURE 
(Bradin Cormack & Lorna Hutson eds., forthcoming 2015). At the moment, only four of the 
approximately forty-five planned contributors are institutionally affiliated with a law school. 
32. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE (3d ed. 2009) [hereinafter POSNER, LAW 
AND LITERATURE]. The first edition of Posner’s Law and Literature, subtitled “A Misunderstood 
Relation,” appeared in 1988 and aimed both to demonstrate that literary works had little to offer for 
legal analysis and to attack the idea of applying literary critical approaches to law. See generally RICHARD 
A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988). In the 1988 volume, 
Posner came across as a “belles-lettristic” reader, more concerned with judging the quality of parts of 
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Turning to the pairing of literature and history, what may be most striking is 
the paucity of actual dialogue between scholars of literature and history despite 
literary studies’ fascination with history and history scholars’ interest in literary texts. 
Pedagogical endeavors to combine the study of history with literature, such as 
Harvard’s History and Literature Concentration, have had great success, at least if 
measured by the number of students they have attracted.33 And yet history as 
conceived in literature departments, including the New Historicism and its 
descendants, and history as practiced by historians remain imperfectly linked. Based 
on a careful analysis of recent scholarship in Atlantic studies and a survey of cross-
disciplinary book reviews between literary scholars and historians, Eric Slauter 
recently concluded: 
[L]iterary scholars now import more from historians than they export to 
them. To put the point in figurative terms that do not disguise the 
economic stakes involved, a trade deficit now exists on the side of literary 
studies. Even as literary scholarship has become markedly more 
“historical,” it has apparently become less marketable to historians.34 
Treating potential explanations and remedies, Slauter contended that literary 
scholars still often rely on already familiar historical materials rather than 
“supply[ing] a real contribution to historical knowledge” or “advanc[ing] a powerful 
theoretical claim to be further developed and historicized.”35 For their part, 
historians could do more to recognize the theoretical insights furnished by the work 
of literary scholars.36 A less superable problem is perhaps presented by the move of 
history as a discipline away from text-based scholarship toward demographic and 
economic models.37 
At the same time, however, a newfound interest in text within legal history has 
the potential for reinvigorating the relation between literature and history, 
particularly as the history of the book has captured the imagination of literary 
 
the literary canon than with understanding how literature might work. See Donald N. McCloskey, The 
Essential Rhetoric of Law, Literature, and Liberty, CRITICAL REV., Spring 1991, at 203, 207. While the newest 
edition aspires to the status of a treatise in the field and seems more open to the possibility that literature 
could offer something to law, it continues to ignore “much of the best work in the field.” See Penelope 
Pether, Book Review, 7 COMPARATIVE CRITICAL STUD. 418, 419–21 (2010) (reviewing POSNER, LAW 
AND LITERATURE, supra). 
33. Between 2007 and 2011, History and Literature was second only to English in the number 
of concentrators that it graduated each year. See Harvard University Fact Book 12 (2011–2012), available 
at http://oir.harvard.edu/files/huoir/files/harvard_fact_book_2011-12_final.pdf (listing the number 
of those graduating with a concentration in History and Literature as fifty-two in 2007, forty-four in 
2008, fifty-four in 2009, fifty-three in 2010, and fifty-eight in 2011). 
34. See Eric Slauter, History, Literature, and the Atlantic World, 65 WILLIAM & MARY Q. 135, 135 
(2008). Treating the subfield of legal history, Margot Finn earlier lamented from the literary vantage 
point that “[l]egal historians’ general reluctance to expand their methodological repertoire and their 
specific failure to avail themselves of analytical insights derived from literature pose a significant 
obstacle to both discipline-based and interdisciplinary studies of Victorian law.” Margot Finn, Victorian 
Law, Literature and History: Three Ships Passing in the Night, 7 J. VICTORIAN CULTURE 134, 140 (2002). 
35. Slauter, supra note 34, at 159. 
36. Id. at 160. 
37. Id. 
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scholars. For example, although Mary Bilder’s work on The Transatlantic Constitution 
focuses on transatlantic legal practice rather than constitutional text per se in 
examining the structures of colonial appeal to the Privy Council in England that 
furnished a model for Supreme Court review of state laws under the U.S. 
Constitution, it simultaneously explores the nature of “legal literacy” within the 
colonies, explaining the cultural and legal consequences of the sparsity of texts 
available for public perusal.38 Addressing an earlier period, Tom McSweeney has 
identified the significance of the transient efflorescence of case law in thirteenth-
century England, at a time previously considered lacking in a precedential approach 
to law.39 In a piece from an earlier Irvine symposium on “Law As . . .”—
Law/Text/Past—Steven Wilf explicitly thematized legal historians’ relation to text, 
lamenting that “text is of essential importance to legal historians and at the same 
time underexamined” while suggesting a way forward in envisioning the “legal 
historian as an interested reader of text.”40 
Finally, law and history is the old, established pair, whose passions have ebbed 
and flowed with new interests and renewed affairs. The Anglo-American story of 
their relation could be narrated as a political history, connected with the 
establishment of the autonomy of law from politics or sovereignty within 
seventeenth-century England. The conventional tale, however, begins in the late 
nineteenth century, with F.W. Maitland.41 As Michael Lobban has recently 
elaborated in an excellent piece on the genealogies of legal history following 
Maitland, “legal historians working in law faculties tended to focus more on 
doctrinal histories. This was true on both sides of the Atlantic.”42 The work of the 
“law and society” movement and the writings of J. Willard Hurst shifted the scene 
in the U.S. academy within the mid-twentieth century.43 As Lobban summarizes: 
Law, in the Hurstian view, was about the practice of government, at every 
level where law structured or regulated the exercise of power between 
people. In his view, the proper way to study legal history was not to look 
at the development of single doctrines over the long term, but to look in 
great detail at the working of law in one particular context and era.44 
With Bob Gordon’s 1984 essay Critical Legal Histories, critical legal history 
broke onto the scene and disrupted the Hurstian vision, insisting upon the 
contingency of legal developments and the mutually constitutive relation of law and 
 
38. See MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL 
CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE 15–30, 73–90, 186–96 (2004). 
39. See Tom McSweeney, English Judges and Roman Jurists: The Civilian Learning Behind England’s 
First Case Law, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 827, 829–37 (2012). 
40. Steven Wilf, Law/Text/Past, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 543, 545–46 (2011). 
41. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I (2d ed., London, Cambridge Univ. Press 1911) (1899). 
42. Michael Lobban, The Varieties of Legal History, CLIO@THÉMIS, June 2012, at 1, 9. 
43. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS (The 
Lawbook Exchange 2007) (1950). 
44. Lobban, supra note 42, at 15. 
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society.45 In the wake of Gordon’s foundational statement of anti-foundationalism, 
legal historical narratives of the kind he advocated have proliferated, perhaps most 
prominently in the work of John Witt, including his book The Accidental Republic.46 
A love triangle may also entail tensions and oppositions between the pairs that 
comprise it or contests over the affections of a central figure. Between law and 
literature and legal history at least two such struggles have occurred, one over 
authority and the other over normativity. Despite historians’ ambivalent relation to 
law’s normativity, both the legal academy and legal practitioners deem the expertise 
of historians central to the proper formulation and understanding of law.47 The 
status of the knowledge derived from literary disciplines remains much less exalted 
within legal institutions. At the same time, law and literature scholarship insists upon 
its normative positions and, in some respects, chastises legal history for its insistence 
on a descriptive rigor that can be separated from normative claims.48 
Imagine, for example, the following scenario. A case reaches the U.S. Supreme 
Court urging the reconsideration of the D.C. v. Heller decision holding that the 
Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms.49 As in Heller itself, 
amicus curiae briefs arguing about the relevant history would proliferate.50 A literary 
critic’s perspective on the meaning of the amendment would be given short shrift 
by the Justices, however.51 Similarly, were a cultural theorist to file a brief 
challenging the possibility within the current social imaginary of separating 
handguns (explicitly protected by Heller) from machine guns and other military 
weapons, this account of the significance of the distinctions within contemporary 
 
45. See Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984). A recent symposium 
in Law and Social Inquiry traced the heritage of Gordon’s essay with contributions by Hendrik Hartog, 
Susanna Blumenthal, Laura Edwards, and Chris Tomlins, as well as Gordon himself. Susanna L. 
Blumenthal, Of Mandarins, Legal Consciousness, and the Cultural Turn in US Legal History: Robert W. Gordon. 
1984. Critical Legal Histories, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 167 (2012); Laura F. Edwards, The History in 
“Critical Legal Histories”: Robert W. Gordon. 1984. Critical Legal Histories., 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 187 
(2012); Robert W. Gordon, “Critical Legal Histories Revisited”: A Response, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 200 
(2012); Hendrik Hartog, Introduction to Symposium on “Critical Legal Histories”: Robert W. Gordon. 1984. 
Critical Legal Histories., 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 147 (2012); Christopher Tomlins, What Is Left of the Law 
and Society Paradigm After Critique? Revisiting Gordon’s “Critical Legal Histories,” 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
155 (2012). 
46. JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, 
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2006) (setting out the story of the 
contingent institutions and encounters that resulted in the twentieth-century American law of 
accidents); Blumenthal, supra note 45, at 177–78 (citing to the Accidental Republic and Roy Kreitner’s 
work as carrying out, in part, the program set forth in Gordon’s Critical Legal Histories). 
47. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, The Role in History in Judging Disputes About the Meaning of the Constitution, 
41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1173, 1176–78 (2009); infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
48. See Stuart Banner, Legal History and Legal Scholarship, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 37, 40–41 (1998); infra 
notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
49. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
50. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Jack N. Rakove et al. in Support of Petitioners, Heller, 554 
U.S. 570 (No. 07-290). 
51. Peter Brooks has shown that this occurred in Heller itself with respect to the amicus curiae 
brief filed by Professors of Linguistics and English. See Peter Brooks, Literature As Law’s Other, 22 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 349, 363–64 (2010). 
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society would largely appear beside the point to the Court. Even when Chief Justice 
Rehnquist invoked the dissemination of the Miranda warning into popular 
consciousness through its ubiquity in culture, he relied on personal experience 
rather than disciplinary expertise.52 
On first blush, one might imagine that the difference lies in the fact that the 
members of the Court already possess both interpretive acumen and cultural 
knowledge, whereas they require the specialized training of historians to uncover 
the relevant history behind constitutional provisions. As any reader of judicial 
opinions already knows though, the kind of history recited by judges often appears 
more like what has been disparaged as “forensic history” than the type of inquiry 
respected by historians.53 Indeed, invocations of history within judicial decision 
making may appear to historians no less illegitimate than judicial interpretive 
practice seems to literary critics or the Court’s account of popular consciousness 
looks to experts in cultural studies. The authority historians currently hold—at least 
nominally—in the judicial process hence stems not from the actuality of a 
specialized knowledge that lawyers do not already possess but from law’s 
recognition of their knowledge as lending authority to judicial decision making. Law 
has determined within the past decade or two that historians’ mechanisms for 
ascertaining historical truth should be included as a part of the process of 
understanding the U.S. Constitution.54 To realize that this conjunction is not 
inevitable one has only to look to the example of seventeenth-century English jurist 
Sir Edward Coke, who explicitly defined his own historical account of the common 
law against the work of chroniclers and annalists, historians he found lacking in the 
rigor of an internal perspective on the law.55 The relation of legal institutions with 
the discipline of history hence possesses a particular salience today, one that literary 
studies lacks and envies. The next question, which is too involved to answer here, 
might be why history currently has such purchase for law and represents the kind 
of expertise to which the Supreme Court must at least pay lip service. 
At the same time, the teaching of and scholarship on law and literature often 
adopt unapologetically normative positions, unlike most rigorous legal history. 
Robert Cover’s classic writings on law and literature insisted upon the normative 
purchase of the endeavor.56 Nor has that tendency been entirely eclipsed within the 
law and literature enterprise. For example, Robin West concludes her recent essay 
 
52. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000) (“Miranda has become embedded 
in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture.”). 
For a discussion of the treatment of the cultural authority of Miranda in the Dickerson opinion, see Kenji 
Yoshino, Miranda’s Fall?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1399, 1412–14 (2000). 
53. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN LIBERTY 5–7 (2005); John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193, 203–04 
(1993). 
54. Heller is a good example of the use of historian’s methodologies in obtaining a fuller 
understanding of the Constitution. See Heller, 554 U.S. 570. 
55. For a discussion of Coke’s treatment of historians unaffiliated with law, see Bernadette 
Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 585–86 (2006). 
56. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982). 
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on Literature, Culture, and Law by observing that “[p]opular narrative fiction, 
television shows, and films, no less than canonical literature, may, on occasion, have 
something true to teach us about law, life and sex.”57 What they have to teach 
consists partly in critique; as West had earlier explained, Tom Wolfe’s novel Charlotte 
Simmons “should be read as a critique of potent and harmful—but nevertheless 
legal—sex, and the culture that legitimates, honors and encourages it.”58 
By contrast, as Steven Wilf has observed in Law/Text/Past, for at least the past 
half century, legal history has been characterized by an avoidance of normativity.59 
This should be no discovery for those of us who have been involved in legal history 
workshops, where disputes often rage over whether a project is excessively 
“presentist” in focus, spawned by a normative desire to use the past, or whether it 
can be considered more rigorously historical, its dominant question instead 
emanating from the archive. Wilf contends that alternative possibilities can be found 
within the history of legal history itself, particularly in the legal realists’ aspiration 
for the normative potential of scholarship in legal history.60 Wilf “insists that the 
demand for normative readings of law’s past comes from the particular ways that 
legal historians must read purposeful legal texts. As suggested, we failed to take 
advantage of the possibilities posed by historical jurisprudence and legal realism of 
a normative turn to history . . . .”61 New approaches to legal history, such as the 
ones signaled by some of the papers that, like Wilf’s, have emerged out of earlier 
“Law As . . .” symposia at the University of California, Irvine School of Law,62 may 
be in the process of rethinking legal history’s neglect of normativity; an opportunity 
for literature may, concomitantly, be on the way. 
II. THE ROMANCE 
 In Rouen, Sartre started to spend time with Olga Kosakiewicz. They 
enjoyed being together, and everyone benefited. Sartre felt reinvigorated in 
Olga’s presence, Beauvoir was relieved to see Sartre more cheerful, and 
Olga liked to feel needed. 
 Before she even set eyes on Sartre, Olga had encountered the legend. 
Beauvoir had talked about him and the couple they formed. Sartre knew 
that. As he wrote later, his relationship with Beauvoir appeared 
“fascinating” and “crushingly powerful” to the people around them. 
“Nobody could love one of us without being gripped by a fierce jealousy—
 
57. Robin West, Literature, Culture, and Law at Duke University (Georgetown Law Faculty, 
Working Paper No. 75, 2008), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/fwps_papers/75. 
58. Id. at 112. 
59. Wilf, supra note 40, at 562. 
60. Id. at 556–64. 
61. Id. at 564. 
62. See Peter Goodrich, Specters of Law: Why the History of the Legal Spectacle Has Not Been Written, 
1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 773 (2011); Tomlins & Comaroff, supra note 3. 
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which would end by changing into an irresistible attraction—for the other 
one, even before meeting them, on the basis of mere accounts.”63 
Passions arise easily in the pedagogical context; hence it is there that the 
possibilities for the romance among disciplines may be most completely realized. 
Julie Peters is doubtless right to lament that the “real” always appears elsewhere 
within exchanges between law and literature.64 Nevertheless, in the classroom, it 
may be the desire for something outside of the discipline—whether “real” or 
imaginary—that most effectively propels interdisciplinary inquiry. The task of 
teaching law and the humanities consists, I contend, in inciting each audience—
whether undergraduates in the humanities, law students, or graduate students—to 
experience a lack within their discipline, a lack that propels the passionate 
investigation of another field. Rather than, however, presenting each mode of 
inquiry as itself deficient, I would embrace a pedagogy that temporarily situates 
students entirely within the technical aspects of the local discipline. Only through 
fully entering into the consciousness of a particular field can one experience a desire 
for another discipline that follows not a path of assimilation or escape but rather 
one of embrace. 
This point could be put in conceptual, rather than romantic, language. Niklas 
Luhmann persuasively did so in describing the relation between legal and social 
systems. In Law as a Social System, Luhmann posits law’s “operative closure” with 
respect to its environment.65 As Luhmann contends, “the legal system operates in a 
normatively closed and, at the same time, cognitively open way.”66 What this means 
is that stimuli from the environment can only affect the legal system indirectly, 
through the recursive operations of that system itself, which proceeds to include or 
reject components of the outside world. This approach reformulates the distinction 
between law and morality. Luhmann insists: 
 The thesis on normative closure above all opposes the idea that morality 
could immediately or intrinsically be understood as valid in the legal 
system. This intrinsic validity has been excluded in many older legal orders 
through formalism—but was then compensated for by the distinction 
between law and equity. In modern society, any understanding of an 
immediate validity of morals in the legal system is even less possible . . . . 
 Only when law is differentiated from the ever-changing tidal flow of moral 
communication, and only when distinctions based on law’s own criteria for 
validity can be made, is it possible to specify the facts which are legally 
relevant and separate them from general appraisal made by persons.67 
 
63. ROWLEY, supra note 7, at 57 (quoting JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, WAR DIARIES (Quintin Hoare 
trans., Verso ed. 1984) (1983). 
64. Peters, supra note 1, at 81–84. 
65. NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 105 (Fatima Kastner et al. eds., Klaus A. 
Ziegert trans., 2004). 
66. Id. at 106. 
67. Id. at 107–08. 
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Although morality is excluded under this account from appearing without mediation 
in law, it can be integrated through the legal systems’ own operations. Even after 
becoming law, this and other material from law’s environment retain traces of their 
location within another system and direct the legal actor toward an investigation of 
the relationship among these systems. 
One consequence of invoking passion—or systems theory—might be a 
movement away from assertions of similarity or difference. Even the most 
sophisticated scholarship in law and literature tends to divide according to whether 
it places emphasis on the resemblance between legal and literary materials or insists 
upon their disparities. For example, in her penetrating book Common Precedents: The 
Presentness of the Past in Victorian Law and Fiction, Ayelet Ben-Yishai contends that “the 
homologous intellectual patterns generated by precedential reasoning in law and in 
literature yield radically dissimilar forms” and that, “[a]though the two kinds of 
narratives . . . read in this book—law reports and realist novels—are both structured 
on precedential reasoning as a means for managing change, their differences are 
more prominent, and more telling, than their similarities.”68 While legal and literary 
forms may, in fact, diverge, the significance of this phenomenon lies not in the 
divergence but rather in the institutional forces producing it. What counts as 
authority is determined within the particular system at issue, whether legal or social 
(or cultural), and stylistic discrepancies index those processes. At the same time, 
identical protagonists pass through these varied systems and may import techniques 
and tools from elsewhere. 
All of this remains quite abstract though; how might a teacher actually serve 
as procuress of these passionate engagements? In order to suggest one possible 
answer, I will briefly describe a pedagogical experiment I began to undertake several 
years ago. Having taught the introductory Constitutional Law class at Cornell Law 
School for a number of years, often to students in the first semester of their first 
year of law school, I grew frustrated with some aspects of the various casebooks 
that I sampled in the effort to enhance students’ experience. Many of the texts 
abbreviate cases so radically that it is impossible to recover alternate readings or to 
see disparate paths that the law might have taken.69 Other casebooks valuably 
furnish historical materials in conjunction with Supreme Court opinions, giving 
context for the development of law.70 Yet engaging in lengthy historical inquiry into 
 
68. AYELET BEN-YISHAI, COMMON PRECEDENTS: THE PRESENTNESS OF THE PAST IN 
VICTORIAN LAW AND FICTION 22 (2013). 
69. While it furnishes an excellent and comprehensive doctrinal overview of constitutional law 
and for a long time formed the basis for my pedagogy, recent editions of Kathleen Sullivan and Gerald 
Gunther’s Constitutional Law, which has now become Kathleen Sullivan and Noah Feldman’s 
Constitutional Law, excerpt some cases so briefly that it is difficult to use them in any way other than 
mapping doctrine. See generally KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(18th ed. 2013); KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (17th ed. 
2010). 
70. See, e.g., PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 261–71 
(5th ed. 2006). 
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the evolution of doctrine under the Commerce Clause frequently exasperates first-
year students who wonder about the relevance of this material to legal practice. It is 
simultaneously difficult to avoid the sense that the histories told in this setting are 
mere forensic history (as John Reid would call it), tending to naturalize the 
jurisprudential place where we have landed.71 Finally, despite the meteoric rise in 
theories emphasizing extrajudicial interpretation and implementation of the 
Constitution,72 these find little purchase within constitutional law casebooks, which 
still remain largely indebted to Supreme Court opinions. 
Having previously attempted to supplement these texts with my own 
materials, from history articles, to statutory text, to essays on constitutional 
interpretation, I decided upon a counterintuitive solution. Instead of adding more 
and more context, I resolved to see what would happen if I presented the lawyers’ 
lawyer version of the materials, fulfilling the presentist desires of the students more 
than they could ever have wished. To this end, I developed new materials around 
several Supreme Court cases that had either been decided in the past term or 
remained pending. We began with National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) 
v. Sebelius, otherwise known as the healthcare decision.73 Doctrinally, this allowed us 
to cover a number of the major congressional powers, including the Commerce, 
Necessary and Proper, and Taxation and Spending Clauses. Rhetorically, it 
presented a fascinating study in contingency, framing, compromise, precedent, 
concurrence, and dissent. 
Prior to commencing the case, I asked the students to peruse the Constitution 
and to read the relevant sections of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
of 2010 (“Affordable Care Act”),74 in order to situate them in the same textual 
position (absent Supreme Court precedent) as the Justices would have been. We 
then sliced through the case, treating the opinions section by section, and covering 
them in their entirety. 
Not only was the NFIB v. Sebelius decision preceded by substantial public 
controversy, but it also entailed a split between members of what is frequently 
considered the conservative wing of the Supreme Court.75 The heart of the 
 
71. See REID, supra note 53. 
72. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (forcefully arguing that the U.S. Constitution was not designed to be 
relegated to the interpretation of judges rather than the people themselves); Larry Kramer, Generating 
Constitutional Meaning, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1440 (2006) (discussing the growing group of scholars 
considering “the Constitution Outside the Courts”). 
73. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
74. 26 U.S.C. § 5000a (2012). 
75. Opposition to the challenges mounted against the Affordable Care Act became quite heated, 
as the title of Paul Krugman’s predecision Op Ed—Broccoli and Bad Faith—indicates. See Paul Krugman, 
Op. Ed., Broccoli and Bad Faith, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2012, at A27. On the other side, a nearly 
simultaneous piece in the National Review insisted that the mandate constituted “government by 
coercion.” Mario Loyola & Richard Epstein, Government by Coercion: What Obamacare’s Individual Mandate 
and Medicaid Expansion Have in Common, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 28, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www
.nationalreview.com/articles/294677/government-coercion-mario-loyola. For a discussion of the split 
among the justices, see infra notes 76–77. 
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disagreement involved the question of whether Congress possessed the authority to 
pass the so-called “individual mandate” provision of the Affordable Care Act, the 
section requiring everyone to purchase insurance or face a penalty.76 Between the 
first challenges to the individual mandate as exceeding Congress’s power and the 
time the Court issued its opinion in NFIB, avid Court watchers first derided the 
notion that the individual mandate would be struck down, deeming such an 
outcome impossible under current precedent, then became increasingly convinced 
that the Court would actually invalidate the provision.77 While the majority did not 
do so, the margin and grounds for reaching a different result were quite tenuous. 
Chief Justice Roberts disagreed with both Justice Ginsburg—who would have 
upheld the mandate under all justifications the government offered—and the four 
Joint Dissenters (Scalia, Roberts, Alito, and Kennedy)—who would have struck 
down the mandate under all available justifications.78 Instead, he split the difference, 
agreeing with the dissenters that the Commerce Clause could not allow Congress to 
force individuals into activity and into participation in the healthcare market, but 
deeming the individual mandate justified under the Taxation Clause, despite 
Congress’s efforts to represent the mandate as anything but a tax.79 
The circumstances surrounding the healthcare decision, although 
contemporary rather than historical, dramatize the contingency of constitutional 
decision making and the role of social movements (such as the Tea Party) in the 
generation of constitutional shifts, aspects that legal historians have been 
emphasizing since Bob Gordon’s Critical Legal Histories and Reva Siegel’s work on 
social movements respectively.80 When teaching the “switch in time that saved the 
nine”—the Court’s supposed capitulation to FDR’s New Deal and its concomitant 
decision to interpret Congress’s economic powers expansively81—it is difficult to 
 
76. 26 U.S.C. § 5000a. 
77. Compare Ryan Lirette, Will the Individual Mandate Hold Up in Court?, AMERICAN (Apr. 8, 2010), 
http://www.american.com/archive/2010/april/will-the-individual-mandate-hold-up-in-court (“[T]he 
majority of constitutional experts are betting that the courts will uphold the mandate. Their prediction 
is based on a simple observation: the mandate is consistent with the past 73 years of broad constitutional 
interpretation, which has granted Congress the authority to regulate nearly anything.”), with Ilya Somin, 
Recent Poll of Supreme Court Experts Finds that Most Expect the Court to Strike Down the Individual Mandate, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY ( June 20, 2012, 1:39 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/06/20/recent-poll-
of-supreme-court-experts-finds-that-most-expect-the-court-to-strike-down-the-individual-mandate/ 
(“A new insider survey of 58 legal experts conducted after the oral arguments [in NFIB v. Sebelius] found 
that most predict that the court will strike down the so-called individual mandate . . . .”). 
78. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2609, 2642. 
79. Id. at 2593, 2601. 
80. See Gordon, supra note 45. For a discussion of the impact of social movements on 
constitutional law, see Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. 
PA. L. REV. 927 (2006); and Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement 
Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001). 
81. Under the traditional account, Justice Roberts’ switch from striking down New Deal statutes 
to his vote in favor of the constitutionality of a federal minimum wage in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 
300 U.S. 379 (1937), deflated the political appeal of President Roosevelt’s proposal that Congress 
“reorganize” the federal judiciary and allow for the appointment of additional Supreme Court justices. 
See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A 
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convey to students anything but the feeling of the ineluctable march of historical 
change, economic expansion dictating the eventual demise of policies rooted in 
eighteenth-century realities. By contrast, the healthcare decision remains recent 
enough in public consciousness that several of the students in my class expressed 
great puzzlement about it on the first day, before realizing that we would be 
covering the case. The confusion these students voiced pertained not only to the 
media’s framing of the case and predictions of what the outcome would be but also 
to the significance of the decision, once rendered. Rationalizations have proliferated 
since NFIB appeared, rendering the outcome more obvious in retrospect.82 
Considering the healthcare decision so soon after its resolution allowed us to inhabit 
its contingency more completely. 
Justifying the decision in light of this contingency required resort to a 
mechanism for constructing authority internal to the legal system, that of furnishing 
precedent. From each opinion, we generated a list of the five precedents that 
seemed most crucial to the historical narrative recounted for every constitutional 
clause. Unsurprisingly, these differed significantly between the Ginsburg opinion 
and the Joint Dissent, but there were also subtle disparities between the Joint 
Dissenters and Roberts as well. Taking our cue from the various opinions, we 
examined the several possible genealogies of the present. In the process, the 
question continually arose as to the relationship between the aims of a history of 
doctrine produced within the legal system and other versions of history. 
By puzzling through the Roberts and Joint Dissenters’ citations in the 
Spending Clause area, we also watched the seamless conversion of precedent from 
one area to another and the generation of constitutional meaning through judicial 
interpretation. In the process of finding that the Medicaid provisions of the 
Affordable Care Act engaged in unconstitutional “coercion” of the states in 
violation of the Spending Clause, the first time that such coercion had been 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 3–5 (1998). Not only was Roberts almost certainly ignorant of the 
plan before casting his vote in West Coast Hotel, but Dan Ho and Kevin Quinn have also recently 
demonstrated that his votes on the Court in general moved significantly and briefly to the left in 1936. 
See generally Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 69, 
69 (2010). 
82. See, e.g., Akram Faizer, Chief Justice John “Marshall” Roberts—How the Chief Justice’s Majority 
Opinion Upholding the Federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 Evokes Chief Justice Marshall’s 
Decision in Marbury v. Madison, 11 U. NEW HAMPSHIRE L. REV. 1, 2 (2013) (arguing that “Chief Justice 
Roberts’s decision is reminiscent of our greatest Chief Justice’s decision in Marbury v. Madison”); 
Bradley W. Joondeph, The Affordable Care Act and the Commerce Power: Much Ado About (Nearly) Nothing, 6 
J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 7 (2013) (explaining “why the ruling’s limited scope should be unsurprising, 
given that the challengers deliberately pushed a narrow theory to make their argument as attractive as 
possible to the Court”); Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison, The Presumption of Constitutionality and 
the Individual Mandate, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS 124 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013) (justifying the Chief Justice’s opinion by arguing 
that statutory analysis should be informed by the presumption of constitutionality); Ilya Somin, The 
Individual Mandate and the Proper Meaning of “Proper,” in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME 
COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS, supra, at 146 (arguing that the decision “fills a gap” in the 
Court’s Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence). 
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discovered, Chief Justice Roberts cited extensively and without much fanfare to 
cases derived from the Commerce Clause area, particularly the “commandeering” 
decisions Printz and New York v. United States.83 In the confusion over differentiating 
“coercion” from “commandeering” and the attempt to discern what the extension 
of the metaphor from commerce to spending might signify, we watched the process 
of constitutional meaning making at work and observed the effects of constitutional 
rhetoric in action. 
Finally, examining the language of the Affordable Care Act itself before 
turning to the case assisted in seeing the mechanisms behind the law’s co-optation 
of facts. Whereas Roberts and the Joint Dissenters framed the individual mandate 
in terms of a distinction between activity and inactivity, insisting that requiring 
individuals to purchase health insurance or face a penalty resembled compelling 
broccoli consumption,84 Ginsburg saw the individual mandate as a necessary part 
of a comprehensive legislative scheme, just as the Court had found the medicinal 
use of marijuana to be legitimately prohibited as part of the federal government’s 
broader regulation of drugs.85 Neither of these accounts was dictated by the 
prejuridical situation, but both served to narrate the facts to legal effect. 
By foregrounding contemporary cases, I asked these first-year law students to 
move from the social system they had been inhabiting to the legal system and to 
observe the process by which that movement was taking place. Through carefully 
inspecting the mechanisms by which they could make themselves legal actors, they 
became aware of law as a discipline while simultaneously witnessing the distinctions 
law draws to render itself independent of its environment. It may be this very 
cognizance of disciplinarity that enables the passion for other disciplines to arise. 
Rather than being sated by the anodyne version of history that appears in casebooks, 
students were prompted to think about the competing forces of historical 
momentum and change that coalesced in the healthcare decision as well as about 
the extralegal implications of granting economic rights as the Affordable Care Act 
arguably did. By reading the passages of the opinion that cited to counterintuitive 
precedents and inquiring about the generation and co-optation of language like that 
of commandeering and coercion, they were incited to imagine a literary approach 
to legal opinions. 
  
 
83. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602–03; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 
(1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
84. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2591, 2650. 
85. Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 
545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (deeming the regulation of concededly intrastate growing of marijuana valid under 
the Commerce Clause as a necessary part of a comprehensive legislative scheme). 
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III. AUDIENCES AND ACTORS 
Paula moved to the middle of the stage. She was not yet very well known 
to the general public, but here everyone admired her art. 
. . . [Françoise] turned her eyes toward Pierre, but Pierre was not looking 
at her. 
He was looking at Xavière. With parted lips and eyes filled with tears, 
Xavière scarcely breathed. She no longer knew where she was; physically 
she didn’t exist. Françoise looked away, embarrassed. Pierre’s insistence 
was indiscreet and almost obscene; that rapt face was not for public 
view. . . . 
“Have you seen Xavière’s face?” Pierre asked. 
“Yes,” said Françoise. 
He had spoken without taking his eyes off Xavière. 
That’s the way it is, thought Françoise. Her features were no more distinct 
to him than they were to herself; amorphous, invisible, she was vaguely a 
part of him. He spoke to her as to himself, but his eyes remained fixed on 
Xavière. . . . 
Applause broke out.86 
While immersion within a disciplinary frame may furnish an initial impetus 
toward exploring and understanding the other disciplines that the field in question 
refracts and redacts, it does not indicate how to move beyond those early steps in 
the direction of a more thoroughgoing interdisciplinary relation. Thinking of the 
connections among disciplines in terms of their performances with and for each 
other could assist both in developing more dynamic modes of pedagogical 
interaction and in moving law, literature, and history in the direction of active 
engagement with contemporary concerns. 
The disciplines of both literature and law divide practices from reflections on 
those practices. In an era when law schools have increasingly hired scholars with 
doctorates as well as JDs and courts accept input from psychologists, sociologists, 
and historians, differences still remain between what is considered part of the 
operations of the legal system and what are deemed critical or other accounts of 
that system. The situation may be even more extreme in the literary context, as the 
demystifying efforts of academics place strain on English Departments’ relation 
with creative writers, who often find it difficult to see their work as refracted 
through the scholarly lens. By contrast, despite the potential discrepancy between 
academic and popular history, history as a practice remains at core the same kind of 
enterprise as history as an academic pursuit. 
One way to conceptualize the duality of practice and reflection on that practice 
is through a notion of audience. Within the love triangle, audience may also have 
analytic purchase. In light of the shifting relations of participants, the position of 
 
86. DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 6, at 149–50. 
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observer and observed may be occupied in rapid succession—or even 
simultaneously—by the same person. The literary critic may thereby function as an 
audience at once for literary production and for legal decisionmaking, while the 
creative writer or historian might likewise sit as a spectator to the unfolding of legal 
dramas. 
In the effort to understand the relations between law, literature, and history 
through the lens of audience, I developed a course on “The Jury as Audience.”87 By 
describing the jury as an audience, the class began by positing the overlap between 
spectatorship and participation, both within law and culture. Simultaneously, it 
emphasized the transit of spectators from one arena to the other and the historical 
dynamics of that movement. Plays such as Aristophanes’ Wasps—performed before 
Athenians steeped in jury service—not only critique the cadre of jurors they 
implicate as venal addicts of condemning, but also suggest the relevance of aesthetic 
spectatorship for political participation.88 
As Lorna Hutson has argued in The Invention of Suspicion, early modern dramas 
such as Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus stage epistemologies that would have been 
familiar to their audiences from the operations of the English jury.89 Moreover, 
within early modern England, the close connection between the Inns of Court and 
the theaters ensured that those studying to be lawyers as well as those serving on 
juries functioned as spectators for plays.90 The Induction to Ben Jonson’s 
Bartholomew Fair, for example, riffs on this overlap between the early modern law 
schools and the theater.91 As we also know from court records and certain dramas’ 
disparate framing for a royal rather than common audience, Kings and Queens 
themselves sat in judgment on theatrical work, exercising their royal prerogative to 
condemn in the dramatic as well as the politico-legal arena.92 Spectators of the often 
legally and politically inflected performances staged in late sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century England were frequently the same as those who judged or 
argued in legal or political contexts.93 These audiences mediated between the literary 
and the legal. Although not simply importing a model of judgment from one sphere 
to the other, they brought their experience as members of a politico-legal 
community or an aesthetic one to bear in performing their other evaluative tasks. 
 
87. The courses took place at Cornell University during the fall of 2010 and the spring of 2012. 
The first was taught exclusively to undergraduates and the second to a group composed half of 
undergraduates and half of law students. 
88. 4 ARISTOPHANES, Wasps, in THE COMEDIES OF ARISTOPHANES 1 (Alan H. Sommerstein 
ed. & trans., 1983). 
89. LORNA HUTSON, THE INVENTION OF SUSPICION: LAW AND MIMESIS IN SHAKESPEARE 
AND RENAISSANCE DRAMA 90–103 (2007). 
90. For more discussion of this point, see Bernadette Meyler, “Our Cities Institutions” and the 
Institution of the Common Law, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 443, 446–50 (2010). 
91. See id. at 448–49. 
92. JONATHAN GOLDBERG, JAMES I AND THE POLITICS OF LITERATURE, at xi–xv (Stanford 
Univ. Press 1989) (1983). 
93. See Meyler, supra note 90, at 446–50. 
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Nor does the model of audience pertain only to trials or staged performances; it can 
also serve to explain aspects of readership within legal and literary contexts.94 
In teaching “The Jury as Audience,” I focused on a particular intersection 
between legal and literary readerships, that which occurred in the late nineteenth 
century, at a moment when readers of sensationalized trial narratives often 
overlapped with devotees of the novel. Many of the nineteenth-century trial 
collections and trial reports address a particular kind of lay reader—namely, a 
juror—and instruct him or her in how to approach the legal scene or the legal 
narrative from a critical vantage point. At the same time, early mystery novels, such 
as Wilkie Collins’s The Law and the Lady, suggest reading, or reading clues, as a model 
for evaluating evidence, and attempt to shape their audiences’ epistemological 
strategies by foregrounding the disparate possibilities presented by different generic 
ways of reading, whether that of the romance or the detective story.95 
This account of the function of mystery novels in refining readers’ evidentiary 
approach might conjure a more recent example, that of the putative “CSI effect,”96 
which the class also considered. Despite the loud media and prosecutorial protests 
over a CSI effect, according to which jurors influenced by the proliferation of 
television shows attributing quasi-magical powers to forensic science demand ever 
increasing physical evidence and state-of-the-art testing in order to convict 
defendants, most empirical studies have suggested that the CSI effect is extremely 
limited, if extant at all.97 A question that these studies raise is why jurors—many of 
whom do, indisputably, watch hour upon hour of such shows—check their CSI-
related requirements at the door when themselves entering upon the task of criminal 
judgment. Do they treat CSI simply as an alternative, fictional realm, without 
consequence to daily life? Or do they contextualize CSI, recognizing its quasi-
science fictional quality in suggesting techniques of analyzing evidence that do not 
 
94. As I have previously argued in Defoe and the Written Constitution, both the novels and political 
pamphlets Daniel Defoe penned suggest a certain myth of the power of the written constitution, 
perhaps best exemplified by his account of the piratical articles to which all crews were obliged to swear 
allegiance, but which were routinely destroyed before capture as potential evidence of the pirate 
conspiracy. The varying audiences of Defoe’s novels—from the children of members of the founding 
generation, to ordinary Americans, to the Founders themselves—may have been influenced by this 
mythology to surround their constitutional documents with greater authority than they might otherwise 
have possessed. Bernadette Meyler, Defoe and the Written Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 73 (2008). 
95. See WILKIE COLLINS, THE LAW AND THE LADY (1903). For an elaboration of this 
argument, see generally Bernadette Meyler, Wilkie Collins’ Law Books: Law, Literature, and Factual Precedent, 
in THE SECRETS OF LAW 135 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2012). 
96. CSI: Crime Scene Investigation (CBS Broadcasting, Inc.). 
97. Tom Tyler’s piece on Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt outlines both the claims for the 
existence of a “CSI effect” and the tenuous nature of the evidence supporting such assertions. Tom R. 
Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 
1050, 1050 (2006). Simon Cole and Rachel Dioso-Villa subsequently examined why media sources and 
prosecutors continued to promote the notion of a CSI effect despite significant empirical evidence 
suggesting that “television drama is [not] disadvantaging criminal prosecution” and that “the opposite 
may just as easily be the case: forensic-themed police procedural dramas may actually advantage the 
prosecution in criminal cases.” Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: 
Media and Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335, 1342 (2009). 
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even yet exist? Whatever the answer to these questions, lack of existence of a robust 
CSI effect indicates that, despite the movement of audiences from one sphere to 
another, culture may not be seamlessly converted into law or vice versa, the 
dominant norms of the social and legal systems altering the subjectivities of even 
those participating as jurors or viewers rather than judges or authors. 
This brings me back to Robin West’s essay on Literature, Culture, and Law.98 
Relying in part on Naomi Mezey’s Law As Culture,99 West considers the cultural 
context in which prosecutors could avidly pursue the accusation of rape against 
members of the Duke lacrosse team, despite the falsity of the charges. One aspect 
of that cultural context included Tom Wolfe’s novel I Am Charlotte Simmons, 
depicting the unwanted yet not coercive sex the work suggests routinely occurs on 
college campuses.100 To the extent that the media conceived of I Am Charlotte 
Simmons as the paradigm for the Duke incident, it furthered the plausibility of the 
putative victim’s story. To the extent that the media conceived of I Am Charlotte 
Simmons as the paradigm, however, as West astutely points out, it should have 
questioned whether rape itself occurred.101 Although the novel represents collegiate 
sex as debilitating for women on campus, it does not depict acts that rise to the level 
of rape.102 There is, however, yet another level of difficulty here in attempting to 
move seamlessly from culture to law that West does not explicitly acknowledge. In 
that movement, it is precisely the nature of Charlotte Simmons as a work of fiction 
that becomes elided. By failing to consider the relative autonomy of law, we run the 
risk of considering a novelistic truth a legal one and neglecting the mediation 
necessary to move effectively from the social into the legal and back again. 
Returning to the pedagogical scene, teaching “The Jury as Audience” to a 
group composed half of undergraduates and half of law students required 
considering the divided audience of the classroom as well as the variegated 
audiences of the literary and legal works we covered. Although sometimes the 
separation caused some stumbling, the combination, at its best, allowed for the 
greater elaboration of both literary and legal perspectives on the material. For 
example, those undergraduates who had taken one or more classes in Shakespeare 
were able to perform literary close readings of scenes in the plays or contextualize 
the works for the benefit of the law students present, while the law students 
frequently relished the availability of an undergraduate audience to appreciate their 
more technical legal analyses of the materials. These disparate approaches were 
most effectively shared through the ten-minute presentations each class member 
was asked to perform on whatever aspect of one of the readings he or she preferred. 
Hearing these presentations gave other members of the group insight into how a 
differently trained audience might read and interpret the same materials. Bringing 
 
98. West, supra note 57. 
99. Naomi Mezey, Law As Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35 (2001). 
100. TOM WOLFE, I AM CHARLOTTE SIMMONS (2005). 
101. West, supra note 57. 
102. Id. 
Meyler_production read v2 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 6/17/2015  10:41 PM 
388 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:365 
together students who are methodologically immersed in law, literature, or 
history—precisely at the moment when they are in the midst of learning how 
disciplinary thinking takes place—may allow more cross-pollination of the fields 
than putting together scholars who are already disillusioned with aspects of their 
area of study and seeking to be rescued from themselves by another approach. If 
the aspiration of the Shakespeare professor Julie Peters presents in Law, Literature, 
and the Vanishing Real to “use law to end poverty, racism, and war” meets with 
derision from his legal academic colleagues,103 the Shakespeare student’s account of 
how generic form works in The Winter’s Tale intrigues law students and prompts 
conversations about the legal significance of dramatic construction. 
As everyone who has encountered participatory theater knows, the audience 
is also an actor. In recent years, however, there have been efforts in both literary 
and historical studies to reimagine the scholar more as an actor and less as an 
audience member. In part stemming from fatigue with critique and the 
hermeneutics of suspicion, academics have proposed new paths, ranging from Chris 
Tomlins’s suggestion of replacing “critical legal history” with an approach 
influenced by Walter Benjamin, to Jeff Dolven and Graham Burnett’s Poetry Lab at 
Cabinet, to Franco Moretti’s call for “distant reading.”104 These developments have 
yet to be fully integrated into work at the intersection of law, literature, and history. 
Although no one voice has so far emerged as dominant in the effort to put 
critique to one side, literary scholars and historians alike have—in what I believe is 
a previously unrecognized synchrony—recently expressed dissatisfactions with the 
inheritance of critical methodologies, which appear to many to have ossified. From 
the historical—or, more precisely, legal history—side, Chris Tomlins’s essay After 
Critical Legal History: Scope, Scale, Structure, takes aim against the thirty-year dominance 
of critical legal history, and its “repeated emphasis upon historical contingency and 
contextualization, its preference for complex relationality, its debunking of secret 
laws of causation.”105 Viewing critical legal history as “squarely in the tradition of 
modernist disenchantment,” Tomlins instead advocates for a Benjaminian version 
of legal history focused on the dialectical image. From a Benjaminian perspective, 
Tomlins contends, 
[T]he role of the critic/historian becomes essential, in that criticism 
completes the text’s meaning retrospectively by revealing its prehistory and 
its posthistory, which is to say its role in the prehistory of what follows. 
That is, criticism loosens from the text the meanings contained with it. It 
does so by mortifying the text, not by evaluating or interpreting it as a thing 
in itself but by corroding it—rendering it a rubble of fragments such that 
its fragment of truth may be extracted from amid the material (mythic) 
 
103. Peters, supra note 1. 
104. See, e.g., FRANCO MORETTI, DISTANT READING 47–48 (2013); Christopher Tomlins, After 
Critical Legal History: Scope, Scale, Structure, ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI., Dec. 2012, at 31, 31; Poetry Lab, 
CABINET MAG. (2011), http://cabinetmagazine.org/events/poetry_lab.php. 
105. Tomlins, supra note 104, at 39. 
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content in which that truth is imprisoned and by which it is obscured . . . . 
[C]ontext must be dissolved if what is sought is to be exposed. . . . 
 Out of the fragments of meaning amassed from the subjection of past 
phenomena to the critical process, the critic/historian constructs 
constellations—that is, new historical objects or dialectical images that join 
together what may be quite distinct phenomena, whose significance can 
emerge only posthumously or retrospectively, in a relationship with the 
now that has apprehended their significance.106 
The emphasis here is on allegorical connections through time rather than the 
concatenations of a particular moment. Instead of focusing on context, Benjamin 
speaks in terms of the event, which “in its singularity takes no meaning from the 
time of its occurrence recorded mechanically or from its apparent relationships with 
other events in historical time.”107 From this Benjaminian account of the philosophy 
of history, Tomlins sketches the possibility of a legal history beyond critical legal 
histories. 
The language of textuality evident even in Tomlins’s gloss of Benjamin is 
perhaps noteworthy. Although Tomlins himself does not reference the literary in 
his piece, Benjamin’s elaborations of a philosophy of history frequently took place 
through readings of texts, from his landmark 1924 essay on Goethe’s Elective 
Affinities onwards.108 Tomlins’s new approach to legal history hence already 
implicates the literary through adopting a Benjaminian framework, yet it fails to 
consider the possibility of such a move for the relationship of law, literature, and 
history. 
Somewhat further afield from the legal, Jeff Dolven’s and Graham Burnett’s 
Poetry Lab presents an alternative for literary education, one that brings out the 
creativity in critique. These evening-long events have often focused on a particular 
poet, using a key concept to enter into his or her work.109 For example, a session 
on Wallace Stevens paid homage to J. Hillis Miller’s book Topographies by focusing 
on space.110 Divided into groups, participants foraged through the local 
neighborhood to generate a map of the local smells (proliferant in the Gowanus 
area of Brooklyn). On returning to Proteus Gowanus, the site of the gathering, they 
wrote poetic postcards, engaging with this aspect of Stevens’ work. Another 
workshop on James Merrill took the form of a séance, complete with Ouija boards. 
 
106. Id. at 42. 
107. Id. 
108. Benjamin’s notion of a “caesura,” at which point “every expression simultaneously comes 
to a standstill, in order to give free reign to an expressionless power inside all artistic media,” although 
elaborated in relation to literature in his essay Goethe’s Elective Affinities, bears implications for his later 
work on history. 1 WALTER BENJAMIN, Goethe’s Elective Affinities, in WALTER BENJAMIN: SELECTED 
WRITINGS, 1913–1926, at 297, 341 (Marcus Bullock & Michael W. Jennings eds., 1996). For a 
discussion of the implications of the caesura for Benjamin’s later work, see Dmitris Vardoulakis, The 
Subject of History, in WALTER BENJAMIN AND HISTORY 118, 123 (Andrew Benjamin ed., 2005). 
109. For a list of the Poetry Lab events, see Poetry Lab, supra note 104. 
110. The description of these events is based on my own participation in the ones discussed. 
See also J. HILLIS MILLER, TOPOGRAPHIES (1995). 
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As the very idea of a poetry “lab” suggests, the emphasis rests on the actions one 
takes in response to creative work and the mechanisms for incorporating prior 
influences into one’s own experiments. 
Both Tomlins’s and Dolven and Burnett’s innovations present the reader and 
the historian as actor rather than simply spectator. This emphasis resonates with 
another recent turn within legal education, that involving the embrace of clinical 
courses. Beginning with NYU, law schools that previously offered one or two 
practical courses—often focusing on landlord/tenant or other issues in the 
surrounding community—began in the past decade and a half to ramp up clinical 
education, so that now, at some schools, it is possible for students to devote almost 
a third of their time to clinics. With media attention prominently focused on the 
demise of legal education as we know it, these clinics are often proposed as the wave 
of the future, and, in the process, opposed to interdisciplinary legal education, which 
remains merely the province of would-be academics rather than practitioners.111 
One of the challenges facing the study of law, literature, and history in the coming 
years will be to counter that notion. New methods in legal history and in literary 
study suggest a way forward that may not entail arguing for law and these humanities 
against clinical legal education, but rather in conjunction with it. Can we, I ask, 
imagine a law, literature, and history clinic, and what would it look like? 
CONCLUSION 
Alone. She had acted alone. As alone as in death. One day Pierre would 
know. But even he would only know her act from the outside. No one 
could condemn or absolve her. Her act was her very own. I have done it of 
my own free will. It was her own will which was being fulfilled, now nothing 
separated her from herself. She had chosen at last. She had chosen 
herself.112 
In the last chapter of She Came to Stay, Françoise does act—with disastrous 
consequences for Xavière and for the love triangle. Pierre and Xavière’s liaison has 
been broken off, but Xavière has learned that Françoise betrayed her by carrying on 
a secret affair with Xavière’s other lover, Gerbert. Deeming her own guilt inexpiable 
as long as Xavière continues to exist and her consciousness persists in judging, 
Françoise opens the gas in Xavière’s room as the latter is about to fall asleep and 
leaves Xavière to perish. 
This Article has attempted to suggest how the disciplines comprising one 
version of law and the humanities—law, literature, and history—might coalesce into 
a true ménage à trois rather than sacrificing one in service of another’s autonomy 
while leaving the third out of the battle. In particular, immersion within a particular 
discipline may not exclude other areas but instead prompt more desire for those 
fields. Likewise, performing a discipline for audiences located within another 
 
111. Editorial, Legal Education Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2011, at A18. 
112. DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 6, at 404. 
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disciplinary frame can prompt reflections from both sides on the particular 
techniques of performance and the boundaries of the frame. Finally, law, literature, 
and history find themselves at an opportune moment for joining together to act 
rather than remaining content with analyzing. I hope that they can act, in whatever 
form, together, not alone. 
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